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Taylorizing business school research:  On the “one best way” 
performative effects of journal ranking lists 
Abstract 
The paper critically examines how work is shaped by performance measures. Its specific 
focus is upon the use of journal lists, rather than the detail of their construction, in 
conditioning the research activity of academics. It is argued that an effect of the “one size 
fits all” logic of journal lists is to endorse and cultivate a research monoculture in which 
particular criteria, favoured by a given list, assume the status of a universal benchmark of 
performance (“research quality”). The paper demonstrates, with reference to the 
Association of Business Schools (ABS) “Journal Guide”, how use of a journal list can come to 
dominate and define the focus and trajectory of a field of research, with detrimental 
consequences for the development of scholarship. 
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Introduction 
The creation of `journal quality lists’ in the field of business and management in the UK has 
coincided with the growing importance and formalization of national research evaluation 
exercises (Geary, Marriott and Rowlinson, 2004; Keenoy, 2005; see also Gendron, 2008). 
The compilers and advocates of these lists say that their intention is to provide an objective 
measure of the comparative esteem of journals using a standardized quality metric, thereby 
overcoming information asymmetries associated with the use of ‘insider’ knowledge (e.g. 
Rowlinson et al, 2011)i. Their use, it is further suggested, can correct the biases  ascribed to 
evaluators of research quality (see, for example, Taylor, 2011). However, when the lists are 
used as a standard to calculate the equivalent of an exchange value of outputs (e.g. journal 
articles) and authors on the academic hiring, promotion and transfer markets, such 
justifications largely disregard the extent to which lists contribute to, and have further 
potential to promote, a commodification of academic labour and a narrowing of scholarship 
(Bryson, 2004; Willmott, 1995; Harley and Lee, 1997; Van Fleet et al, 2011).  
The pressures upon business school academics are particularly intense where these schools 
have become amongst the largest of University departments, with corresponding implications 
for institutional funding and reputation. The significance and influence of journal lists 
increases as competition between institutions for resources, symbolic as well as material, 
intensifies. As journal quality lists (e.g. those created by the Financial Times and the 
Association of Business Schools) become influential for processes of recruitment, promotion 
and the selection of staff/outputs for submission to evaluation exercises, they come to shape 
the nature, structure and conditions of academic work (Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Sauder 
and Espeland, 2009). Such performative effects are, of course, greatest when they weaken or 
marginalize alternative criteria and processes of evaluation. Examining the use and effects of 
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journal lists is therefore important not simply for better understanding, or refining, how such 
metrics are devised (see Truex et al, 2011 for a critical review) but also, and more 
significantly, for appreciating and questioning their constitutive role in defining and policing 
the focus and direction of research activity.  
Regardless of the particular methodology or algorithm used to compute journal lists (see 
Morris, Harvey and Kelly, 2009 for a typology), their design shoehorns horizontal diversity 
of research and scholarship into a single, seemingly authoritative vertical order. By valorising 
the ’research agenda’ institutionalized in the topics, methods and perspectives favoured by 
‘A’ category journals, the use of journal lists to assess the quality of research sends out a 
strong ‘market signal’: it privileges the research agenda pursued in those journals; and, 
conversely, it devalues research published elsewhere, irrespective of its content and 
contribution. When an article’s place of publication, as indicated by its ranking in a journal 
list, becomes more significant or valued than its scholarly content, faculty find themselves 
increasingly in receipt of the following kind of ‘advice’ from Deans, research directors and 
senior colleagues. “If you wish to be counted as ‘research active’ and so be submitted to the 
XXX evaluation exercise or to improve your promotion prospects, your work should be 
designed, shaped and honed to emulate the genre of research published in journals most 
highly ranked in the prescribed journal list. Failure to demonstrate this competence risks 
staying on probation / not being counted as research-active / not being considered for 
promotion/  being moved to a teaching only contract”. Whatever its intended purpose, the 
journal list has become a potent instrument of managerial decision-making whose use, we 
will argue, has the performative effect of homogenizing, in addition to commodifying and 
individualizing, research activity.  
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This concern complements a number of other objections levelled against journal lists which 
range from issues about the technicalities of their construction, through criticisms of their 
neglect or devaluation of other kinds of publication (e.g. monographs), to their exclusion of 
“research that matters” and their obsessive or “fetishised” use (Őzbilgin, 2009: 113; see also 
Harzing and Metz, 2012; Worthington and Hodgson, 2005; Keenoy, 2005; Clarke, Knights 
and Jarvis, 2012; Knights, Clarke and Jarvis, 2011; Willmott, 2011). Our focus here, in 
contrast, is upon the performative effects of a “one size fits all” logic of research evaluation. 
(see also Nkomo, 2009).  To illustrate these effects, our analysis examines in some detail the 
development, justification and application of the Association of Business Schools’ (ABS) 
Academic Journal Quality Guide. Our example is taken from the UK context where the use of 
journal lists is probably most widely and deeply embedded. But, of course, their use has been 
widespread, and seems set to become more influential. Downloads of the `Guide’ from the 
ABS website are reported to have been, in one year (2010), `90,000…from nearly 100 
countries’ (Rowlinson et al, 2011: 443).  
We begin by considering the squeeze on heterogeneity by the “one size fits all” philosophy 
enshrined in the compilation of journal lists – a restrictive process that is increasingly 
reinforced by reliance upon citation counts and impact factors.  To underscore the 
homogenizing influence of journal lists, we draw a parallel between the “one best way” 
design of industrial production advocated by Frederick Taylor (see Kanigel, 1995) and the 
“one size fits all” design philosophy enshrined in journal lists. Detailed consideration is given 
to the establishment and use of the ABS ‘Quality Guide’ before we assess claims that its use 
brings cultural and economic benefits. 
Measuring scholarship 
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The UK has been in the vanguard of national assessments of research quality. The first 
assessment was undertaken in 1986 and it has been repeated every 5-7 years with the most 
recent exercise completed in 2008 (see Gillies, 2008). The development of business school 
journal lists has been associated with increasingly selectivity in these exercises and the rapid 
expansion of such schools within Universities. Before the exercises and the appearance of  
journal lists, academics in UK Universities were expected to publish where they found a 
receptive audience; and if their work appeared in a widely read and respected journal so 
much the better. An initial effect of introducing a formal system of research quality 
evaluation, we submit, was to make the playing field of  business and management research 
more level (see Morris, 2011:39-40) as it was self-defeating to exclude heterodox or 
questioning scholarship (e.g. critical accounting or `soft OR/systems’ ) on ideological 
grounds. During the 1980s and 1990s, the national assessment exercises tended to raise the 
profile and expand the space for innovative and heterogeneous scholarship, and so nurtured 
the development of comparatively diverse research cultures across UK business schools.  
Without succumbing to misty-eyed nostalgia, management and business scholarship during 
the late 1980s and 1990s pushed the boundaries of disciplines, and substantially opened up 
the intellectual landscape (e.g. Jackson and Keys, 1989; Hopwood and Miller, 1994). 
Subsequently, in many areas these tendencies have slowed (see Piercy, 2000 for a trenchant 
critique), aided inter alia in recent years by the use of journal lists to evaluate the quality of 
research (and researchers) (see Hopwood, 2008). This slowing of innovation has coincided 
with increasing pressures to ‘game the system’ (Macdonald and Kam, 2007; 2008; Lee, 2011) 
as national research exercises have become both more critical and more divisive in their 
distributional effects
ii
. Central to such game playing are efforts to define and legitimize 
preferentially rewarded research space (see Marsden, 1993; Bedeian, 2004). So, for example, 
to the extent that a list elevates an established, North American-dominated, set of journals as 
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the benchmark of `top-notch’ research, a particular,  neo-positivist research agenda is deemed 
to yield the highest `quality’ publications (see, for example, Lee and Elsner, 2008).  
One size fits all: the citation and impact metric 
A distinguishing feature of journal rankings is the application of a “one size fits all” logic. 
They necessarily assume a single, shared basis for specifying and comparing the quality of 
different journals
iii
. Each ranking metric comprises elements of (i) measures of impact 
derived from numbers of citations in selected journals and (ii) some moderation of (i) by 
forms of peer evaluation which, as Peters et al (2012) note, can be a mixed blessing. The 
resulting rank order is often then hierarchically divided into “top” (A/world elite) “middle” 
(B/international) and “bottom” (C/national) categories. For illustrative purposes, we take up 
the ABS `Quality Guide’, but a comparable analysis and critique is, in principle, applicable to 
other journal quality lists.  
Citation indices, it is widely assumed, provide the most reliable indicator of journal quality as 
they are blind to any specific values or criteria that may `bias’ processes of peer review. Yet, 
arguably, reliance upon citation counts and associated indices necessarily privileges 
particular kinds of journals, irrespective of their distinctive contents: namely, journals that are 
long established, which publish topics that are widely researched, use methodologies that are 
frequently deployed and/or engage familiar theoretical frameworks, etc (see McWilliams et 
al, 2005 Parker and Thomas, 2011; Mingers and Xu, 2010). Journals with high citation 
indices tend to be well resourced and benefit from influential sponsors. For example, 
members of the (American) Academy of Management receive the equivalent of a season 
ticket, in the form of subscription to a selection of its journals. Like globally branded sports 
teams, these journals are best placed to attract star players - the editors and board members 
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who command the greatest intellectual capital, and who act as a magnet for authors whose 
work is already well known, and which is therefore more likely to be cited. This is significant 
because journals with high citation scores tend to rely upon a few ‘big hitters’ (Baum, 2011). 
Their citation counts effectively enable others who publish in top-tier journals, but whose 
work is infrequently cited, to “free-ride on a small number of highly-cited articles, which are 
principal in determining journal Impact Factors” (Baum, 2011: 465). Reliance upon citation 
indices in the construction of journal lists conceals the `big hitters’ effect and it also 
marginalizes journals dedicated to less popular / emergent areas of research and 
methodologies. 
Compilers of journal lists invariably rely upon journal impact factors (JIF), based upon a two, 
three or even a five year period. Using this time frame also has implications. It may be more 
justifiable in fast-moving areas such as the natural sciences, but it is of dubious relevance for 
the social sciences, including the field of management and business studies. Mingers (2008) 
study of 600 papers published in 1990 in six well-known management science journals 
showed that citations for these papers did not reach their peak until six years after 
publication. Many papers were still being cited fifteen years after publication. And it was not 
possible to predict the eventual number of citations received by a paper from citations in the 
early years. Whereas “shooting stars” are highly cited immediately, perhaps because they 
catch a fashionable wave of work, and then fade into obscurity, “sleeping beauties”, may be 
so innovative that their importance is only appreciated, and is correspondingly influential, 
much later on.  
Subject to the reservations entered above, and within the important exception of articles that 
are cited ritualistically or repeatedly demonised as examples of unwelcome scholarship, there 
is a strong case for identifying articles of the highest quality as those that continue to be cited 
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many years after their publication – that is, the “sleeping beauties”, not the “shooting stars”. 
A perverse performative effect of ascribing the highest value to “shooting stars”, as happens 
when JIFs are based upon five or fewer years, is to incentivise the production of 
comparatively safe papers which contribute to old or fashionable topics and issues, rather 
than encouraging innovative scholarship that, potentially, has a longer lasting relevance (see 
also Hopwood, 2008). In sum, in the field of management and business, there are major 
problems and limitations of relying upon citation counts to determine journal quality (see also 
Truex et al, 2011)
iv
. 
Heterogeneity at risk 
The image of sporting league tables, with their organization into divisions and top clubs, is 
frequently invoked to characterize and legitimize journal rankings. The aptness of the parallel 
is, however, limited and misleading. In competitive sports, team managers have broadly the 
same objective: in many ball sports, for example, the aim is to score goals without conceding. 
Despite intensifying “isomorphic pressures” (Rowlinson, Hassard and Mohun, 2010: 167), 
which are compounded by the use of journal lists, the objectives of journal editors are, in 
contrast, comparatively diverse. That is to say, they have diverse ambitions that are not 
reducible to an emulation of journals that are in the premier division of the rankings. Across 
the extensive and variegated field of management and business studies, editors and 
contributors participate in diverse epistemic communities (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) where 
divergent views are harboured about what is “the best” or the “most valuable” research. 
When establishing a new journal, there is often an ambition to address emergent areas, 
develop new approaches and/or engage innovative perspectives. The “one size fits all” logic 
of quality assessment does not, and cannot, acknowledge or value this heterogeneity. It can 
only devalue and/or ignore it. 
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At the same time, it would be naïve to deny how editors are subject to reputational and 
commercial pressures that are intensified by the competitive use of citation scores and JIFs as 
performance indicators which may induce them inter alia to emulate the genre of scholarship 
published in top-tier journals. As Hopwood (2008) comments, editors of new or lowly-ranked 
journals may bow to pressures to “replicate the biases” of top tier journals instead of seeking 
to carve out a specialism of their own. And this herd mentality may extend to the more 
established, second tier journals where editors come under pressure from commercial 
publishers to `up’ their JIFs. Often this deferential strategem has the paradoxical consequence 
of a journal’s lesser status being confirmed by an “almost feudal form of behaviour with the 
lowly genuflecting to the more highly placed” (Hopwood, 2008: 90). The likelihood of such 
an outcome is increased when citation scores influence adoption decisions by libraries and 
when authors seek out highly cited/ ranked journals in which to publish in an effort to raise 
their personal citation rates (Judge, Cable and Colbert, 2007; Sharplin and Mabry, 1985). 
These can then be “cashed in” in the promotion and transfer markets, and in the selection 
process for submission of staff/outputs to research evaluation exercises.  
Marginalizing innovation 
In this highly competitive milieu, it would be surprising if many journal editors were unable 
to resist all temptation, including material incentives, to game the system in order to increase 
their JIFs – for example, by favouring articles that are assessed to have “shooting star” 
potential (see above), or by inviting authors to consider including reference to articles that 
have been published in the journal. What happens, then, if a specific area of scholarship, or a 
favoured approach to a field of investigation, does not share the particular research agenda 
and associated set of values privileged in the most highly cited or ranked journals? Journals 
dedicated to peripheral areas and approaches are often marginal, or invisible, to citation 
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indices. As a consequence, they tend to be poorly rated within, or excluded by, ranking lists. 
Well-documented examples include the areas of sustainability (see Wells, 2010) and 
innovation studies (see Rafols et al, 2011). But a similar fate befalls a wide range of work 
that addresses non-mainstream topics and embraces heterodox methodologies and 
perspectives in journals that lack the profile and institutional support enjoyed by those 
published by the (American) Academy of Management, for example. This disadvantage 
extends to much multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary work that is not 
readily accommodated within disciplinary silos (see Meriläinen et al, 2008).  
The marginalization of heterodox research is illustrated by the editorial policy of the (US-
based) journal Operations Research, widely regarded as one of the top two journals in its 
field. Operational Research (OR) has mathematical roots but since the 1970s, especially in 
the UK, the adequacy of mathematical modelling of complex real-world problems has been 
questioned, resulting in the development of a new area of OR, known as “soft OR” or “soft 
systems” (Checkland, 1981). Yet, no papers on soft OR have ever been published by 
Operations Research, or in the other `top’ (also US-based) journal, Management Science. 
When challenged by a letter in OR/MS Today (Ackerman and 48 others, 2009), signed by  
academics from around the world, the response from the Editor was that, as far as Operations 
Research was concerned, non-mathematical OR was not OR and therefore not publishable. 
Since Operations Research and Management Science are the only two journals in the ABS 
list to be ranked 4* for OR, soft OR academics are, by definition, incapable of, or disqualified 
from, producing work that is “world leading” as the REF would put it.   
OR may provide a ‘limit’ case but an equivalent restrictive logic applies across other 
specialist fields of management (e.g. International Business), and this is despite repeated 
exhortations in `top-tier’ editorials to develop a more expansive and inclusive research 
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agenda (see also McWilliams et al, 2009). At best, publishing research in highly ranked 
journals which does not fit their established mould is conditional upon shaping and revising 
submissions in a manner that emulates a model of rigor ascribed to the physical sciences 
(Thomas and Wilson, 2011). Even when the data are qualitative - and when there is no 
explicit hypothesis testing of propositions; no reference to internal, external or construct 
validity; and no preoccupation with the operationalization, measurement and statistical 
analysis of variables - the ethos of positivism, in the numerous guises of neo-positivism, 
tends to hold sway (e.g. Scandura and Williams, 2000; Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). 
To the extent that a journal list broadly reflects, endorses and reproduces the hegemony of 
this neo-positivist tradition of scholarship, its most potent (performative) effect is to devalue 
and marginalize, if not exclude, heterodox forms of scholarly contribution, and thereby 
induce a homogenization of research activity.  
One best list: Taylorizing business school scholarship 
For a majority of senior managers - from research directors, through deans to vice-
chancellors - the ranking of their university’s departments, including its business school, in 
national evaluation exercises is the key indicator of its status in relation to other universities. 
The position of departments in the resulting league table also indicates a rise or decline of 
their standing since the previous exercise. In turn, the outcome of the evaluation is an 
indicator of the stewardship of senior managers in preparing for the exercise - with regard to 
staff recruitment and retention as well as to fostering a supportive research environment. The 
development and widespread adoption of the ABS Journal Guide stems, we suggest, from the 
performance anxiety of university managers.   
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Performance anxiety 
Determining whether the outputs of staff are of adequate quality to be submitted to  research 
evaluation exercises and, if so, which publications to select, presents university managers 
with a major challenge, especially when the reputation of the university and the business 
school is research-based, and so is heavily dependent upon the outcome. When faced with 
such troublesome decisions, the availability of a journal list is a seductive decision-making 
aid as it purports to provide an impersonal and objective basis for assessing the quality of 
research published by staff, and thus offers a basis for making and justifying difficult and 
divisive decisions. The appeal of a list is especially strong in contexts of diversity where there 
are multiple paradigmatic differences over what counts as quality - differences that can be as 
acute and delicate within business schools as they are between schools.  
 
PLACE EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As university managers wrestled with consequential, and politically charged, decisions in 
selecting staff and their outputs for the 2008 UK evaluation exercise, a further consideration 
was the knowledge that outputs judged to be of the highest quality (i.e. as 4*, see Exhibit 1) - 
were very likely attract a significantly greater (but unspecified at the submission stage) 
weighting for funding purposes than outputs judged to be 3* or , 2*. There were therefore 
material inducements, in addition to symbolic benefits, associated with submission of outputs 
with the best chance of being judged as 4* or at least 3* quality; and, conversely, there was a 
concern to minimize the number of staff with outputs at risk of being evaluated as 2* or 
below.  
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Faced with this challenge, how might research directors and deans of business schools hope 
to minimize the risks and maximize the rewards of the exercise, thereby securing their 
personal, collegial and corporate reputations? Might the assessment process and associated 
procedures offer any pointers to a defensible stratagem? The public record for the previous 
(2001) national evaluation exercise stated that the Business and Management Panel read “15-
30 per cent of outputs with some reading as much as 75%” (Bessant et al, 2003: 53). The 
Panel was noticeably silent on the question of how outputs that it did not read were assessed. 
It was unlikely that the volume of outputs for the 2008 exercise would be smaller, or that the 
size of the Panel would be significantly larger (or its operation as a body would become 
highly unwieldy). So, an obvious question presented itself: how would Panel members find 
the time to base their assessment on reading the outputs? And, if they couldn’t, what would 
they do? Would they not have to rely upon some other, proxy measure of quality?  
 
PLACE EXHIBIT 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Some indications of how the 2008 Panel would operate were provided in its statement of 
Working Methods, published in January 2006 (see Exhibit 2). It this statement, the use of any 
journal lists to evaluate the quality of submitted outputs were explicitly excluded: “the 
assessment will be one of expert review based on professional judgement”. A lingering 
question remained, however, about how practically this undertaking could be fulfilled in the 
time available (a few months) by a Panel comprising less than twenty members. Closer 
consideration of the 2008 Panel’s statement of its Working Methods revealed a commitment 
“to collectively examine in detail at least 25% of the submitted outputs” (emphasis added). 
So, how were the remaining outputs to be assessed?  
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It could be inferred from its Working Methods statement that the Panel would rely upon its 
“professional judgment” to assess the remaining outputs; and that it would do this without 
reading the outputs “in detail”. This inference pointed in the direction of Panel members’ 
(expedient) reliance upon some other indicator(s) of the quality of not-read-in-detail outputs - 
outputs which, it could be anticipated, would contain a very high percentage of journal 
articles. The most obvious proxy indicator of the quality of such outputs is the publication in 
which they appear. Whatever the explicit and repeated pronouncements of the Panel, its huge 




For members of research committees, research directors and deans of business schools, a 
possible remedy for their performance anxieties (see above) presented itself in the form of the 
indicator of publication quality provided by a journal rankings list
vi
. There was, however, an 
irksome difficulty. In 2006, when the Working Methods of the 2008 evaluation Panel were 
published, numerous journal lists were in circulation, including those constructed by several 
UK business schools, such as Aston, Cranfield, Durham, Imperial, Kent and Warwick (see 
also http:// harzing.com/). Supposing that Panel members would be obliged to resort to a list 
when assessing up to 75% of outputs that would not be read “in detail”, there was no way to 
know, or deduce, which list or combination of lists they might use to assess those outputs. 
Faced with this uncertainty, a shared strategic objective of deans, especially those heading up 
research-based business schools, was, we conjecture, collectively to overcome the vertigo of 
uncertainty by establishing, endorsing and promoting a preferred journal list.  
The creation of the ABS list was sponsored by the deans of UK business schools through the 
ABS which hosts their regular meetings and activities. The publication of Version 1 of the 
ABS list in January 2007
vii
 coincided with, and drew legitimacy from, the endorsement of 
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journal ranking lists in other fields by influential bodies such as the Science and Technology 
Committee of the House of Commons
viii
. With the appearance of a list sponsored and 
endorsed by deans, the relevance of other ‘local’ lists diminished. As its creators of the ABS 
list claim, and not without justification, it “has been widely adopted as a policy tool in UK 
business schools and indeed in business schools in many parts of the world” (Kelly, Morris 
and Harvey, 2009: 2). They also note that, “In preparing for the RAE 2008, many university 
and business school managers…made use of the ABS guide in planning their submissions” 
(Kelly, Morris and Harvey: 2). Given this application of the ABS list, and its continuing use 
in preparations for the 2014 evaluation exercise, it is relevant to consider further how its 
construction and justification has contributed to exerting an influence over the range and 
direction of business and management research. 
Managing by numbers: The ABS `Journal Quality Guide’ 
In the run-up up to the 2008 evaluation exercise, the ABS “Journal Quality Guide” became 
adopted as the “de facto standard” across UK business schools (Mingers, Watson and 
Scaparra, 2012: 3). Its relevance for this purpose was crudely signalled by Version 1 of the 
ABS list in which journals were grouped using a five point scale that directly mimicked the 
scale used by the Panel. As Rowlinson, Hassard and Mohun (2010: 157) observe, the scale 
was adopted, “in anticipation of the rating system to be used in RAE 2008”, a view that finds 
confirmation in the Introduction to Version 1 of the `Guide’ (see Exhibit 3).  
 
PLACE EXHIBIT 3 HERE 
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In place of any principled articulation or defence of the ABS list – for example, by indicating 
how it might contribute to promoting more innovative research and scholarship - its architects 
simply anticipate and openly commend its managerial use. The preparation of the list is 
warranted on the grounds that, “people do not always read all that they are expected to read”, 
from which it follows, apparently, that “it is surely a good thing if a systematic method of 
determining journal quality, like the ABS guide, is used”; the alternative being “the 
unsystematic and imprecise methods that might prevail in the absence of ranking journal 
titles” (Morris, Harvey and Kelly, 2009: 1449). In other words, the list is commended as a 
handy, expedient tool for those charged with making onerous decisions about their 
colleagues’ careers, yet who are disinclined to prioritize time for reading and assessing the 
work itself, or seeking advice from subject specialists. To the extent that this commendation 
is followed, the performative effect of journal lists is to frame, guide and justify decisions on 
what counts as “quality research” and where resources are allocated.  
Performative Effects of the ABS List as a Policy Tool 
The conflation of the scales used in the ABS list with the 2008 assessment exercise, and the 
calculation that the Panel would make expedient use of a journal list, make it probable, as the 
architects of the ABS list claim, that the ABS list has been “widely adopted as a policy tool in 
UK business schools”, and was used “in planning their submissions to evaluation exercises” 
(Kelly, Morris and Harvey, 2009:2). Moreover, the findings of a modelling exercise, its 
architects argue, also demonstrate “a high degree of congruity between the judgments 
reached by the 2008 Panel and the journal quality rankings of the ABS guide” (Kelly, Morris 
and Harvey, 2009:3). An implication of this “congruity” is that savvy university managers 
made use of the ABS list when selecting staff and outputs for the 2008 exercise and that, 
despite their repeated protestations to the contrary, members of the evaluation Panel were 
17 
heavy users of the list. In order to assess such claims it is important to take a close look at the 
results of the 2008 evaluation exercise.  
Mingers, Watson and Scaparra (2009) examined the overall results for each business school 
submission to the Panel. Their analysis necessarily relies upon available, aggregated 
information on the outcomes of the 2008 exercise profiled as the percentage of outputs 
awarded a particular grade from 4 to 1 and ungraded (see Exhibit 1). The profile is compared 
to the actual journal-based outputs submitted by each business school or management 
department in order to determine whether the results could be recreated through an imputed 
ranking of the journals. The main findings of interest to the present analysis are:  
 Finding. A much greater concentration of outputs as journal articles and correspondingly 
less as books or reports than in previous years – in 1996, 69% were journals whereas in 
2008 the figure was 92%.  
Comment. This increase cannot be attributed to the ABS list per se but it does perhaps 
indicate increasing risk-avoidance behaviour to which the significance assigned to journals 
by the ABS list contributes, leading to the conclusion that “at least you are safe with a 
refereed-journal paper, especially if it’s in ABS”. The implication is that academics should 
direct their research activity primarily to what is publishable in journals rather than through 
other media (e.g. monographs). 
 Finding. The number of journal titles submitted increased from 1275 in 1996 to 1639 in 
2007. Of the journal outputs submitted to the 2008 exercise, only 50% appeared in the 
ABS list.  
Comment. This shows the vast range of research carried out within business and management 
that does not have the “ABS stamp” of recognition. This remarkable diversity remains to be 
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adequately acknowledged by the ABS list. We are concerned that this range will be narrowed 
if, in future, the (ABS) list becomes even more hegemonic in defining where management 
research is published. 
 Finding. Evidence that the ABS list was used in making submissions – for instance 
comparing the ABS journals that were submitted with those that were not, 45% of those 
not submitted were ABS 1*, while only 4% were ABS 4*. An article appearing in a 
journal ranked as 1* or 2*  in the ABS list was generally not submitted even though it 
might be assessed to make a substantial and well received contribution to its field.  
Comment. This tendency militates against newly developed journals and innovative work. 
Mingers, Watson and Scaparra (2012) conclude that “there is evidence of extensive 
selectivity in submissions” guided by the pecking order of journals on the ABS list. They 
suggest that the presence and position of a journal on the ABS list was a “possible bias” with 
regard to the judgments of Panel members. This does not imply that Panel members directly 
consulted a list but, rather, that a `list mentality’ may have been acquired by some Panel 
members, predisposing them to value outputs published in journals ranked comparatively 
highly on the ABS list. 
 Finding. Evidence of an association between the proportion of a department’s submission 
appearing in ABS journals and the evaluation it achieved. In other words, in general, 
departments with a greater concentration of ABS journals did better.  
Comment. There is not necessarily a direct causal effect here – members of a department in 
which well-regarded research is undertaken will tend to publish in journals which are 
included and highly ranked in the ABS list. However, some submissions were virtually 100% 
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ABS journals, pointing to a high degree of managerial selectivity based upon the use of the 
ABS list. 
 Finding. Mingers, Watson and Scappara’s (2012) analysis indicates “differences 
[between the ABS ranking and RAE grades] for particular journals with some being two 
or even three grades apart” (Mingers, Watson and Scappara, 2012: 25). There is evidence 
of dispersion around the grade of a journal, i.e., papers from the same journal being 
awarded different grades, as the RAE Panel expected a priori, and claimed a posteriori 
(e.g. for the journal Industrial Relations – “4* 53.6; 3* 0.0; 2* 8.8; 1* 36.7 O*0.0)* 
(Mingers, Watson and Scappara, 2012: 20-22) 
Comment. For research managers seeking to “game the system”, this indicates a downside of 
reliance on a list when selecting outputs for submission, rather than making peer-reviewed 
judgments about their merit
ix
. 
The actual grades awarded to individual outputs are not published. It is therefore necessary to 
underscore that it is impossible to know definitively whether the 2008 Panel members 
assigned a high grade to some articles in journals that were not ranked highly on the available 
ABS list; or, indeed, if a low grade was given to articles published in more highly ranked 
journals. Taylor (2011) has used regression analysis to assess the extent to which similar 
aggregate results could have been obtained by simply using the ABS list together with two 
other variables measuring the size of the submission, and membership of university 
groupings such as the Russell Group (a grouping of top UK universities). Taylor found that 
he could explain around 90% of the variation in mean score per department using these 
variables, which certainly suggests a high degree of correlation, at least in aggregate, but it 
does not shed light on differences at particular grade levels – e.g. percentage of 4*.  
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Such differences are, however, potentially illuminated by Mingers, Watson and Scaparra 
(2012). They show the following proportions – 4* 15%, 3* 31%, 2* 37% and 1*17% – for 
publications entered in the 2008 exercise that appear in the ABS list. The equivalent 
percentages which their study estimated from the results of the exercise were – 4* 18%, 3* 
31%, 2* 28%, 1% 22% and 0* 2%. These results suggest that the Panel awarded more 4* (if 
repeated across all entries this would have been about 377 extra 4* outputs) as well as more 
1* (and 0*). In other words, the Panel was more positive or generous in its assessments than 
the ABS list at the upper 4* end. These differences may not seem great but the weights for 
awarding funding were strongly skewed towards 4* (4*:9; 3*:3; 2*:1; 1*:0), and so have a 
significant financial effect for business and management research across the UK. 
Discussion: The ABS List and the Taylorization of Business School Research 
The claim by architects of the ABS list that “by promoting a broader consensus...researchers 
will benefit collectively both culturally and economically” (Morris, Harvey and Kelly, 2009: 
1446, emphases added) rather echoes Taylor’s assertions when introducing his principles of 
scientific management to rationalize industrial production. The consensus claim has been 
challenged elsewhere (Willmott, 2011) and we have questioned the claimed material benefits 
of the list. We therefore confine our comments to how the architects and sponsors of the ABS 
list have responded to expressions of dissensus, or cultural heterogeneity, including those 
which point to the adverse effects of its use upon research activity.  
A specific, documented example is the misgivings voiced by the UK Committee of 
Professors in OR (COPIOR). They wrote to the ABS to communicate their concerns about 
the use of the list in certain business schools where, for example, early career academics are 
under pressure to publish in an ABS 4* journal before they can pass probation. In its response 
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to COPIOR, the ABS replied that it simply produced the list, and that how the list is used is 
not its responsibility (email communication). Rather like Taylor, any problems associated 
with using the list are attributed to its imperfect or misdirected application or, more recently, 
to “predelictions and prejudices” amongst journal editors and referees that the ABS list 
merely “reflects” and renders more “visible” and available to “challenge”, thereby ignoring 
its performative effects (Morris et al, 2011: 563).  The architects and sponsors of the ABS list 
willingly take credit for what they extol as its individually and managerially beneficial effects 
(e.g. widening access to previously restricted information and assisting managers seeking “a 
reliable means of assessing the achievements of their academic staff” (Harvey, Morris and 
Kelly, 2008: 1)). But, to date, they have resisted being “held responsible for at least some of 
the reasonably predictable effects of their actions” (MacIntyre, 1999: 312), and so they 
effectively deny, or only selectively acknowledge, their moral agency. Is this perhaps a case 
of wilful blindness? 
For the use of a journal list to be contemplated and justified, its performative effects in 
narrowing, impeding or inhibiting diversity must be downplayed or simply ignored. In the 
case of the ABS list, its architects first acknowledge that the ranking of journals courts “the 
danger that highly original work fails to make a significant contribution to the field because it 
is damned by the name of the publication it appears in” (Morris, Harvey and Kelly, 2009: 
1449). They also concede that work appearing in a journal ranked highly in a list can be seen 
in a better light that it would otherwise merit. But, they then push such considerations aside in 
order to establish and refine a single list that aspires to be definitive and of universal 
applicability. In order to create a metric with general applicability or universality, its 
particularity must be obscured– a particularity that unavoidably privileges the values of 
certain research traditions while it marginalizes others. The particularity of the ABS list is 
further disguised, as noted earlier, by the adoption of the 1*- 4* grading scale devised for the 
22 
2008 evaluation exercise. Quality criteria (see Exhibit 1) used by the Panel to assess research 
outputs are superficially indistinguishable from criteria used to rank of journals in the ABS 
list. Use of the same scale is, at best, confusing and misleading. Whereas the 2008 Panel’s 
evaluation criteria explicitly rely upon the exercise of  “professional judgment” in evaluating 
each output on its own merits (albeit not in detail, see 
http://www.rae.ac.uk/pubs/2006/01/docs/i36.pdf), the ABS list assigns quality to outputs 





If the logic of applying the ABS list is taken to its ultimate conclusion, the 22 “world elite” 
journals identified in its most recent edition (Version 4) should become the benchmark for 
business and management scholarship in the UK. Indeed, such a move has been advocated by 
those, including a member of the 2008 Panel, who contend that using such a benchmark is the 
way to make UK management and business research genuinely “world leading” (Saunders 
and Wong, 2011; Saunders, Wong and Saunders, 2011). Had this advice been followed by the 
2008 Panel, a very small amount of funding would have been directed to a tiny number of 
institutions (e.g. London Business School, see Saunders, Wong and Saunders, 2011: 412) 
employing researchers with the capability and inclination to confect papers compliant with 
the requirements of such “world leading journals”.  
If diversity of research is to flourish rather than be smothered by the homogenizing logic of 
journals lists, proactive interventions are required. In the UK context, we suggest that the 
Business and Management Panel for any future evaluation exercises might: 
1. Reiterate the exclusion of all use of journal lists from the evaluation process.  
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2. Actively welcome the submission of research monographs and other forms of output, 
thereby mitigating fears that such outputs are too risky to submit.  
3. Encourage submission of outputs pursuing a broad research agenda and adopting a 
wide range of research styles.  
4. Affirm the importance of research that addresses the problems that the world faces, 
and not just the managerially defined problems identified by executives and/or the 
narrow topics and scientistic methods which currently dominate top-tier journals.  
5. Comment directly upon the contribution of journal lists to the development of the 
field.  
The use of a journal list to evaluate research quality, we have argued, induces a narrowing of 
scholarship and so acts surreptitiously to “limit academic freedom” (Tourish, 2011: 369). 
Accordingly, our chief policy recommendation is a moratorium on their use. Unsurprisingly, 
the architects of the ABS list are hostile to this proposal. To date, the objections to the use of 
journal lists to assess “research quality” have also been ignored, resisted or rejected by 
university managers and narrowly careerist academics who welcome a performance metric, 
that mitigates uncertainties about what makes an academic a more desirable and highly priced 
commodity – in terms of being recruitable, promotable, eligible for submission to evaluation 
exercises, and so on. What is revealing about the objection of the architects of the ABS list is 
their assumption that a moratorium would require “policing” or “enforcement” (Rowlinson et 
al. 2011: 444), presumably by some managerial authority, rather than an agreement amongst 
self-regulating peers to suspend, and so effectively abolish, their use. The lead given by the 
2008 and 2014 evaluation Panels could be followed by collectively agreeing to return the 
genie to the bottle. It should be clear that our call for a moratorium places no “curbs on 
academic freedom to analyse publicly available data and publish findings” (Rowlinson et al. 
2011: 444) .  Such data analysis can continue but our hope is that a fuller appreciation of the 
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dubious basis and adverse effects of the use of journal lists to evaluate research quality would 
accompany such analysis and so accelerate their demise.  
If our moratorium proposal is considered excessively radical or censorious, then the ABS or 
an equivalent body might develop numerous lists as a way of recognizing and encouraging 
scholarly diversity, innovation and multi-disciplinarity. Lists could be developed for 
heterogeneous forms of research - on particular topics, within specific fields or sub-fields, 
adopting a variety of methods and/or guided by different theoretical approaches.  This 
proposal, we readily acknowledge, multiplies rather than eliminates the “one-size fits all” 
logic common to all journal lists. But the resulting profusion of lists would surely serve to 
mitigate the homogenization of research resulting from ascribing authority to One Best List 
(see also Adler and Harzing, 2009: 90-1).  If there were twenty or fifty lists, each covering 
journals relevant to a particular topic, sub-field, method or theoretical orientation, the effect 
would be to subvert the effect of relying upon one list to judge scholarly quality. But a 
moratorium on the use of journal lists for making decisions on recruitment, promotion and 
research evaluation submission is more consistent with our analysis, and so is the preferred 
policy recommendation. The plea to “develop and use [evaluation] systems that are reliable 
and valid and justifiable to all major stakeholders, internal and external” (Hitt and Greer, 
2012) may be as commendable as Apple Pie but, in our view, it is politically naïve. Its pursuit 
is likely to perpetuate the shortcomings of using a journal list to evaluate research quality that 




It is hoped that the evidence and arguments presented in this paper will stimulate further 
discussion of the pros and cons of the use of journals lists. Our analysis has examined the 
application of the ABS list in the UK where the use of such a list is most advanced and 
widespread. Rather than focus upon its idiosyncratic features, we have stressed its typicality 
with regard to its construction and effects. Accordingly, our analysis and conclusions are 
broadly applicable to the use of the ABS list, or equivalents, elsewhere in the world. 
To pay attention to the proclaimed virtues and latent vices of journal lists might seem to be 
esoteric and self-indulgent when compared to research that addresses topical issues of 
management practice or aspires to advance theory in vaunted areas like strategy or finance. 
But this judgment incompletely appreciates how the entire field of management scholarship 
and research can be significantly influenced and directed by evaluation criteria and metrics, 
such as those enshrined in journal lists. Paying attention to the effects of such lists is 
important because, rather like the time and motion techniques developed by Taylor or the 
infamous evaluations produced by credit ratings agencies prior to the 2008 financial 
meltdown, they exert potent and pervasive performative effects in commending and 
resourcing some forms of  (research) activity whilst devaluing and impeding others. By 
providing a means of adjudication equivalent to Taylor’s “scientific” calculations and 
prescriptions, the ABS list offers a technically elegant fix for a troublesome managerial 
problem as it disregards its unintended consequences, including the homogenization of 
research. 
The claim of architects of journal lists is to have invented the equivalent of “a better 
mousetrap” – in the form of a superior device for identifying the quality of research. The 
numerically based, rationally calculated, centrally administered, bureaucratically assembled 
list is commended as a worthy replacement for the time-consuming and comparatively 
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unsystematic process of carefully reading and considering scholarly work. In contesting this 
commendation, we have highlighted the spurious objectivity of citation metrics and JIFs and 
argued that lists valorise formal comparability to the detriment of substantive contribution 
and diversity. A key indicator of an academic’s scholarly credentials then becomes the 
possession of technical, instrumental competences for shaping and shoehorning research to fit 
the style of scholarship published in journals highly ranked by the favoured list.  
A Taylorist infatuation with precision and systematicity obscures and homogenizes the 
features of a field which, as the creators of the ABS list acknowledge has, up until now  
“resisted normative pressures to coalesce around a set of ontological, epistemological and 
methodological norms (Tranfield and Starkey, 1998)” (Morris, Harvey and Kelly, 2009: 
1444, emphasis added; see also Becher, 1989). Research in UK business schools, as they note 
elsewhere, exhibits “differences in values, theoretical reference points, methods, and writing 
styles” (Morris, Harvey and Kelly, 2009: 1449, emphasis added). If this diversity is to be 
valued and revitalized, rather brushed aside and smothered, then the overall assessment of the 
“quality” of the contribution of articles that appear in a particular journal cannot convincingly 
be made by reference to a single, standardising and homogenising  measure.  
 
References 
Ackerman F  and 48 others (2009)  The case for Soft O.R. OR/MS Today, 36: 20. 
Adler NJ and Harzing A-W (2009) When Knowledge Wins: Transcending the Sense of and 
Nonsense of Academic Rankings. Academy of Management Learning and Education 
8(1): 72-95. 
27 
Baum JA  (2011) Free-Riding on Power Laws: Questioning the Validity of the Impact Factor 
as a Measure of Research Quality in Organization Studies. Organization 18(4): 449-
466 
Becher T (1989) Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual Enquiry and the Cultures of 
Disciplines. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Bedeian AG  (2004). Peer Review and the Social Construction of Knowledge in the 
Management Discipline, Academy of Management Learning & Education, 3(2): 198-
216  
Bedeian AG, Van Fleet DD  and Hyman HH  (2009a) Scientific Achievement and   
Editorial Board Membership. Organizational Research Methods 12(2): 211-238 
Bedeian AG, Van Fleet DD  and Hyman  HH  (2009b) Circle the Wagons and Defend the 
Faith: Slicing and Dicing the Data. Organizational Research Methods 12(2): 276-295 
Bessant J, Birley S, Cooper C,  Dawson S,  Gennard J,  Gardiner M,  Gray A,  Jones P,  
Mayer C,  McGee J, Pidd M and Rowley G (2003) The State of the Field of Business 
and Management Research: Reflections of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) 
Panel. British Journal of Management 14(1): 51-68. 
Bryson C (2004) What about the workers? The expansion of higher education and the 
transformation of academic work. Industrial Relations Journal 35: 38–57 
Burgess TF and Shaw NE (2010) Editorial Board Membership of Management and Business 
Journals: A Social Network Analysis Study of the Financial Times 40. British Journal 
of Management 21(3): 627-648. 
Checkland P (1981) Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. Chichester: Wiley. 
Clarke C, Knights D and Jarvis C (2012) Labour of Love: Academics in Business Schools. 
Scandinavian Journal of Management 28(1): 5-15 
28 
Espeland,WN  and Sauder M (2007) Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures 
Recreate Social Worlds. American Journal of Sociology, 113(1): 1-40 
Geary J, Marriott L and Rowlinson M (2004) Journal Rankings in Business and Management 
and the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise in the UK. British Journal of 
Management, 15: 95-141 
Gendron Y  (2008) Constituting the Academic Performer: The Spectre of Superficiality and 
Stagnation in Academia. European Accounting Review 17(1): 97-127 
Giacalone RA (2009) Academic Rankings in Research Institutions: A Case of Skewed Mind-
Sets and Professional Amnesia.  Academy of Management Learning and Education 
8(1): 122-126. 
Gibbert M, Ruigrok W, and Wicki B (2008) What Passes as a Rigorous Case Study? 
Strategic Management Journal 29: 1465-1474 
Gillies D (2008) How Should Research Be Organized? London: College Publications 
Grey C (2010) Organizing Studies: Publications, Politics and Polemic. Organization Studies 
31(6): 677-694. 
Harley S and Lee F (1997) Research Selectivity, Managerialism, and the Academic Labor 
Process: The Future of Nonmainstream Economics in U.K. Universities. Human 
Relations 50(11): 1427-1460 
Harvey C, Morris H and Kelly A (eds.) (2008) Academic Journal Quality Guide Version 2. 
Introduction: Context, Purpose and Methodology.  Association of Business Schools 
available at http://www.the-
abs.org.uk/files/ABS%20Journal%20Ranking%20Guide%20Introduction.pdf, 
Accessed 20 October 2011.  
29 
Harvey C,  Kelly A,  Morris H and Rowlinson M (eds) (2010) Academic Journal Quality 
Guide Version 4, Association of Business Schools available at http://www.the-
abs.org.uk/files//absalphawintro.pdf. Accessed 20 October 2011. 
Harzing A-W and Metz A (2012) Practicing What We Preach: The Geographic Diversity of 
Editorial Boards. Management International Review 00 DOI 10.1007/s11575-011-
0124-x 
Hinings C R (2010)  Thirty Years of Organization Studies: Enduring Themes in a Changing 
Institutional Field. Organization Studies 31(6): 659-676. 
Hitt, MA. and Greer, CR. (2012) The Value of Research and its Evaluation in Business 
Schools: Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg. Journal of Management Inquiry 
21(2): 236-240  
Hogler R and Gross MA (2009) Journal Rankings and Academic Research: Two Discourses 
about the Quality of Faculty Work. Management Communication Quarterly 23(1): 107-
126 
Hopwood AG (2008). Changing Pressures on the Research Process: On Trying to Research in 
an Age When Research is Not Enough. European Accounting Review 17(1): 87-96 
Hopwood AG and Miller P (eds) (1994) Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
House of Commons (2004) Research Assessment Exercise: A Re-Assessment. Science and 
Technology Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2003-4, HC586, September. 
Jack GA, Calás MB, Nkomo SM and Peltonen T  (2008) Introduction to Special Topic 
Forum: Critique and International Management: An Uneasy Relationship? Academy of 
Management Review 33(4): 870-884 
Jackson M and Keys P (eds) (1989) OR and the Social Sciences. London : Plenum 
30 
Judge TA, Cable DM, Colbert AE and Rynes SL (2007) What Causes a Management Article 
to be Cited – Article, Author or Journal? Academy of Management Journal, 50 3): 491-
506 
Kacmar K and Whitfield J (2000) An Additional Rating Method for Journal Articles in the 
Field of Management. Organizational Research Methods 3: 392-406. 
Kanigel R (1995) The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of 
Efficiency. Boston: MIT Press. 
Keenoy T (2005) Facing Inwards and Outwards at Once: The Liminal Temporalities of 
Academic Performativity. Time and Society 14(2/3): 303-21 
Kelly A, Morris H and Harvey C (2009) Modelling the Outcome of the UK Business and 
Management Studies RAE 2008 with Reference to the ABS Journal Quality Guide. 
Association of Business Schools available from http://www.the-
abs.org.uk/files//RAE2008_ABS2009_final.pdf . Accessed 21 October 2011. 
Knights D, Clarke C and Jarvis C (2011) It’s a Bitter Sweet Symphony, This Life: Fragile 
Academic Selves, Bristol Business School Working Paper 
Knorr-Cetina K (1999) Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Lee N (2011) Reflections on Assessing Academic Quality in Marketing and the UK REF.  
European Journal of Marketing, 45(4): 477-483 
Lee F and Elsner W (2008) Publishing, ranking, and the future of heterodox economics. On 
the Horizon 16(4): 176 – 184 
MacIntyre A (1999) Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency. Philosophy 74: 
311-329. 
Macdonald S and Kam J (2007) Ring a Ring o’ Roses: Quality Journals and Gamesmanship 
in Management Studies. Journal of Management Studies 44: 640–655. 
31 
Macdonald S and Kam J (2008) Quality Journals and Gamesmanship in Management 
Studies. Management Research News 31(8): 595–606. 
Marsden R (1993) The Politics of Organizational Analysis. Organization Studies  14, 1: 93-
124  
McWilliams A, Siegel D and Van Fleet DD (2005) Scholarly Journals as Producers of  
Knowledge: Theory and Empirical Evidence Based on Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Organizational Research Methods 8(2): 185-201 
McWilliams A, Lockett A, Katz A and Van Fleet DD (2009) Who is Talking to Whom? The 
Network of Intellectual Influence in Management Research. Journal of Applied 
Management and Entrepreneurship, 14(2): 61-81 
Meriläinen S, Tienari J, Thomas R and Davies A (2008) Hegemonic Academic Practices: 
Experiences of Publishing from the Periphery. Organization 15(4): 584-597. 
Mingers J (2008) Exploring the Dynamics of Journal Citations: Modelling with S-curves. 
Journal Operational Research Society 59(8): 1013-1025. 
Mingers J and Burrell Q (2006) Modelling Citation Behavior in Management Science 
Journals. Information Processing and Management 42(6): 1451-1464. 
Mingers J, Watson K and Scaparra P (2012) Estimating Business and Management Journal 
Quality from the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise in the UK. Information 
Processing and Management 00  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ipm.2012.01.008. 
Mingers J and Xu F (2010) The Drivers of Citations in Management Science Journals. 
European Journal of Operational Research 205 (2): 422-430. 
Morris H (2011) Business and Management Research in the UK from 1900 to 2009 and 
Beyond. In: Lee B and Cassell C (eds) Challenges and Controversies in Management 
Research.  London: Routledge, pp 30-55  
32 
Morris H, Harvey C and Kelly A (2009) Journal Rankings and the ABS Journal Quality 
Guide. Management Decision 47(9): 1441-1451. 
Morris H, Harvey C, Kelly A and Rowlinson M (2011) Food for Thought: A Rejoinder on 
Peer Review and RAE 2008 Evidence, Accounting Education: An International Journal 
20 (6) : 561-573 
Nkomo SM (2009) The Seductive Power of Academic Journal Ratings: Challenges of 
Searching for the Otherwise.  Academy of Management Learning and Education 8(1): 
106-112. 
Özbilgin MF (2009) From Journal Rankings to Making Sense of the World. Academy of 
Management Learning and Education 8 (1): 113-121. 
Parker M and Thomas R (2011)  What is a Critical Journal? Organization 18 (4): 419-428. 
Peng MW and Dess GG (2010) In the Spirit of Scholarship. Academy of Management 
Learning and Education 9(2): 282-298 
Peters K, Daniels K, Hodgkinson GP and Haslam SA (2012, online) Experts’ Judgements of 
Management Journal Quality: An Identity Concerns Model. Journal of Management 
DOI: 10.1177/0149206311434532 
Piercy N (2000).Commentary: Why It Is Fundamentally Stupid for a Business School to Try 
to Improve its Research Assessment Exercise Score. European Journal of Marketing, 
34 (1/2): 27-35 
RAE (2006) Panel Criteria and Working Methods: I38 Business and Management Studies, 
available at http://www.rae.ac.uk/pubs/2006/01/docs/i36.pdf Accessed 20 October 
2011. 
RAE (2009), RAE 2008 Subject Overview Reports: I36 Business and Management Studies, 
available at http://www.rae.ac.uk/pubs/2009/ov Accessed 20 October 2011. 
33 
Rafols I, Leydesdorff L, O‘Hare A, Nightingale P and Stirling A (2011) How Journal 
Rankings can Suppress Interdisciplinarity: The Case of Innovation Studies in Business 
and Management, Working Paper, Science and Technology Policy Research, 
University of Sussex, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ir28/IDR/Rafols2011-
Rankings&IDR.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2011. 
Rowlinson M, Harvey C, Kelly A, Kestinova D, Morris H and Todeva E (2010) Business 
History in the UK Research Assessment Exercise. European Business History 
Association, Newsletter 31: 4-10. 
Rowlinson M, Harvey C, Kelly A and Morris H (2011) The Use and Abuse of Journal 
Quality Lists. Organization 18 (4): 443-446. 
Rowlinson M, Hassard J and Mohun S (2010). Research Audits and their Financial 
Consequences. In: Cassell C and Lee B. (eds) Challenges and Controversies in 
Management Research London:  Routledge. 
Sauder M and Espeland WN (2009) The Discipline of Rankings: Tight Coupling and 
Organizational Change American Sociological Review 74 (1) :63-82. 
Saunders J and Wong V (2011) Manoeuvring towards Research Decline: The RAE and the 
Decline of Britain's International Research Standing. European Journal of Marketing 
45(4): 484–512. 
Saunders J, Wong V and Saunders C (2011) The Research Evaluation and Globalization of 
Business Research. British Journal of Management 22: 401-419. 
Scandura TA and Williams EA (2000) Research Methodology in Management: Current 
Practices, Trends, and Implications for Future Research. Academy of Management 
Journal 43(6): 1248-1264. 
Sharplin AD and Mabry RH (1985) The Relative Importance of Journals Used in 
Management Research: An Alternative Ranking. Human Relations 38 (2):139-149. 
34 
Singh G, Haddad KM and Chow CW (2007) Are Articles in “Top” Management Journals 
Necessarily of Higher Quality? Journal of Management Inquiry 16 (4): 319-331. 
Starbuck WH (2005) How much Better are the most Prestigious Journals? The Statistics of 
Academic Publication. Organization Science 16(2): 180-200. 
Taylor J  (2011) The Assessment of Research Quality in UK Universities: Peer Review or 
Metrics? British Journal of Management, 22(2): 202–217.  
Thomas H  and Wilson AD  (2011) “Physics Envy”, Cognitive Legitimacy or Practical 
Relevance: Dilemmas in the Evolution of Management Research in the UK’, British 
Journal of Management, 22 :443-456. 
Tourish D (2011) Leading Questions: Journal Rankings, Academic Freedom and 
Performativity: What is, or Should be, the Future of Leadership? Leadership, 7(3): 367-
381. 
Tranfield D and Starkey K (1998) The Nature, Social Organization and Promotion of 
Management Research: Towards Policy. British Journal of Management 9(4): 341-353. 
Treasury (2006) Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014: Next Steps. 
Budget, March 2006, London. 
Truex D, Cuellar M, Vidgen R, and Takeda H (2011) Emancipating Scholars: 
Reconceptualizing Scholarly Output. 7
th
 International Critical Management Studies 
Conference, Naples available at 
http://www.organizzazione.unina.it/cms7/proceedings/proceedings_stream_13/Truex_e
t_alii.pdf  Accessed 13 November 2011. 
Van Fleet DD, Kacmar KM, Griffin RW, Ford RC and Duncan WJ (2011) Towards Finding 
the Balance of Art and Science in Management: A Market Approach to Valuing 
Management Research. Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship 16(1): 
3-27. 
35 
Wells P (2010) The ABS Rankings of Journal Quality: An Exercise in Delusion. Working 
Paper, The Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and 
Society, Cardiff Business School available at 
http://www.brass.cf.ac.uk/uploads/010610_ABS_Rankings.pdf Accessed 21 October 
2011. 
Willcocks L, Whitley EA and Avgerou C (2008) The Ranking of Top IS journals: a 
Perspective from the LSE. European Journal of Information Systems 17: 163–168. 
Willmott HC (1995) Managing the Academics : Commodification and Control in the 
Development of University Education in the UK. Human Relations 48(9): 993-1028  
Willmott HC (2003) Commercialising Higher Education in the UK: The State Industry and 
Peer Review. Studies in Higher Education 28(2): 129-141. 
Willmott HC (2011) Journal Llist Ffetishism and the Pperversion of Sscholarship: Rreactivity 
and the ABS Llist. Organization 18(4): 29-442 
Worthington F and Hodgson J  (2005) Academic Labour and the Politics of Quality. In: 
Higher Education: a Critical Evaluation of the Conditions of Possibility of Resistance, 
Critical Quarterly, 47 (1‐2): 96‐110. 
Worrell DL  (2009) Assessing Business Scholarship: The Difficulties in Moving Beyond the 











Exhibit 1 RAE Definitions of Quality 
4* 
Quality that is world-leading in terms of originality, significance 
and rigour 
3* 
Quality that is internationally excellent in terms of originality, 
significance and rigour but which nonetheless falls short of the 
highest standards of excellence 
2* 
Quality that is recognised internationally in terms of originality, 
significance and rigour 
1* 
Quality that is recognised nationally in terms of originality, 
significance and rigour 
Unclassified 
Quality that falls below the standard of nationally recognised 
work. Or work which does not meet the published definition of 











Exhibit 2 RAE Working Methods 
`The assessment will be one of expert review based on professional judgement. 
Each sub-panel member will be expected to form a view on all submissions. Sub-
panel members with relevant specialist knowledge will assess cited work from all 
submissions…They will focus detailed examination on work which has not 
undergone peer review, or is published in new and less familiar media, or which is 
deemed to be potentially of the very highest standards. In conjunction with 
specialist advisers and members of other sub-panels to which work is cross-
referred, the sub-panel expects to collectively examine in detail at least 25% of the 
submitted outputs.”  
 









Exhibit 3 Quality rating and meaning from ABS Journal List 
4 *  A top journal in its field Publishes the most original and best executed research 
papers. Journals typically have high submission and low acceptance rates. Papers 
are heavily refereed and the journals have high citation impact factors in their sub-
field. 
3 *  A highly regarded journal in its field Publishes original and well-executed 
research papers. These journals typically have good submission rates and are very 
selective in what they publish. Papers are heavily refereed and the journals have 
fair to good citation impact factors. 
2 *  A well regarded journal in its field Publishes original research of an acceptable 
standard. Papers are fully refereed and the journals have modest citation impact 
factors or do not carry one at all. 
1 *  A recognised journal in its field Publishes research of a modest standard or has 
yet to establish a reputation by virtue of being launched recently. Few journals in 
this category have an impact factor. 
0 *  A journal not recognised as an authentic research publication Journals aimed at 
practitioner audiences which attract academic contributors and which do not 
generally rely on peer review. 
(Morris, Harvey and Kelly, 2009: 1448)  
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i
 In the example of the ABS journal list, this justification involves some re-writing of history. The second 
paragraph of the Introduction to Version 1 of the ABS Quality Guide explicitly states that it was “issued in 
January 2007 in order to assist member schools in making their preparations for the UK Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) 2008)” (see also below).  The lead author of this re-write is an historian, See 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/cer/documents/ABS%20Journal%20Ranking%20Guide%20Introduction.pdf.   
ii
 There is no space to elaborate upon other influences , such as the political  climate of neo-liberalism manifest 
in the re-commercialization and corporatization of higher  education (Willmott, 2003). This has provided much 
grist, but lent little encouragement, to heterodox scholarship. 
iii
 For a list that is selective but does not rank its constituents, see Willcocks, Whitley and Avgerou, (2008). 
iv
 On the other hand, when sufficient time has elapsed to disclose the articles that make a sustained 
contribution, citations may usefully inform processes of peer review that otherwise, when reliance only upon 
the judgments of established academics (such as ourselves) may result in a failure to appreciate new, path-
breaking scholarship. 
v
 Indeed, it has been unequivocally asserted that the 2001 Panel `assessed research in terms of the journals in 
which it was published’ (Macdonald and Kam, 2007: 711), although it is unclear on what basis this claim is 
founded. 
vi
 As Worrell (2009: 127 cited by Peng and Dess, 2010: 288) has joked, “The Dean may not know much about 
research but at least he or she can count”. Even basic numerical skill is unnecessary when the only managerial 
competence required is an ability to match staff publications with the status conferred upon them by a journal 
rankings list. 
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vii
  For an overview of how the ABS list was constructed, see Willmott (2011). The process may account for 
some disquieting anomalies.  For example, the journal Business History which, according to the Web of Science, 
had 161 citations and an impact factor of 0.250 during the period 2001-2007, received a 4* rating in the ABS 
rankings list whereas The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, which had 361 citations and a 0.615 
impact factor for the same period, did not appear on the list, although submissions from both journals were 
made to RAE 2008 (see Rowlinson, Harvey et al, 2010: 10) .   
viii
 “In 2004, this Committee has put its considerable weight behind the use of metrics to support or even 
replace peer review” (House of Commons, 2004: 3 cited in Taylor, 2010: 2); and this endorsement was 
subsequently supported by the Treasury which in 2006 favoured a more “cost-effective” assessment process 
based upon quantitative data (Treasury, 2006 cited in Taylor, 2010: 2-3). 
ix
 Of course, the peer review process is time-consuming, imprecise, unsystematic and subject to cronyism 
(Bedeian, Van Fleet and Hyman, 2009a; 2009b; Peters et al, 2012), and so is easily trashed for being inefficient 
and unreliable, in contrast to a journal list which offers impressive precision and systematicity. The creators of 
the ABS list assert that “although high quality research may on occasion be published in lesser ranked journals 
and vice versa, these exceptions to the rule do not invalidate the overall assessment of the quality of the research 
published in a journal” (Harvey, Kelly, et al, 2010: 4). We beg to differ as a published research tends to point in 
another direction (see Starbuck, 2005). Addressing the question `Are Articles in “Top” Management Journals 
Necessarily of Higher Quality?’, Singh, Haddad and Chow (2007:327)  conclude that evaluation processes using 
`“top journal” publications as the sole or primary criterion for evaluating research and publication performance 
is a classic case of “throwing out the baby with the bathwater” .  
x
 In the latest edition of the ABS list there is an elite 4* category above the 4 category, so it no longer quite 
mirrors the grading proposed for the 2014 assessment exercise. 
